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FONTES JURis GENTIUM. Edidit Viktor Bruns. Digest of the Diplomatic
Correspondence of the European States, 1856-1871. Berlin: Carl Hey-
mams Verlag. 1932. Volume I, part I. pp. 432.
Ibid. Digest of the Decisions of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 1922-1930. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1931. Volume I,
parts 1 and 2. pp. 260.
Ibid. Digest of the Decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
1902-1928. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1931. pp. 306.
Ibid. Decisions of the German Supreme Court relating to International
Law, 1879-1929. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1931. pp. 943.
THEsE several works, products of the scientific research of the Institut fOr
auslandisches 5ffentliches Recht und Vilkerrecht at Berlin, are, in my opinion,
the outstanding contributions to the apparatus of international law since the
publication of Moore's Digest of International Law. In making available source
material, they attest the conviction that an accurate knowledge of the past
is the most reliable guide for human progress, an axiom sometimes lost sight
of in the concoction of 'intricate schemes for international government. At
all events, Professor Bruns and his collaborators have in these volumes made
available in readily accessible form an essential part of the materials out of
which international law is compounded.
The method adopted in all four works is to classify the material digested
or reprinted according to a topical outline of international law, so that a
particular subject may be pursued through the various sources analyzed. The
.headings are given in three languages-German, French, and English. But
the digest itself varies in this respect. In the diplomatic correspondence, the
extracts are reproduced in the original language and, if this is not one of the
three more current languages, are accompanied by a translation, if an official
one was published. The extracts from the decisions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice are reproduced in the two official languages, French
and English, only, whereas the opinions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
are digested in the three languages mentioned. So also are the opinions of
the German Supreme Court; but the appropriate parts of the decisions them-
selves, which follow the Digest, are printed in the original only. The sources
are always indicated, and simple yet ingenious mechanical devices facilitate the
work of the investigator.
Perhaps the most unique of the volumes under review is the Digest of Euro-
pean diplomatic correspondence, 1856-1871. Here material is uncovered which
in large part has been a closed book to the student of international law. A
great mass of official and unofficial collections of documents have been laid
under contribution to produce this, the first of four volumes on the period, and
the colossal and thoughtful character of the enterprise is evident throughout.
Classification of such material and judgment on its importance call for the
highest degree of editorial skill and acumen. That capacity is apparent on
every page. The material from the Permanent Court of International Justice
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration is perhaps more accessible than the
diplomatic correspondence, but its classification under familiar topical headings
will give it a currency it would not otherwise possess. The opinions of the
German Supreme Court will embody, for most students, a new source of in-
vestigation for international law, and the profession will observe with interest
the prolific contributions of that Court to the subject.
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One reviewer, in speaking of the digest of decisions, made the remark that
not all the extracts quoted could properly be considered international law.
Certainly not; and it does not give much credit to the editors to assume that
they thought so. What they have done is to make generally available expres-
sions of opinion on legal questions coming from authoritative sources. The
weight to be given to those opinions is a matter for the investigator to deter-
mine for himself, but he needs all the light he can get to determine how much
importance to attribute to a particular dictum, view, or announced rule. That
light, these materials help to afford. Political views on many topics are occa-
sionally assembled, and here also it is the investigator's task to evaluate for
himself these official opinions or arguments.
The volumes under review should inspire scholars in every country to make
available their national contributions to the field of international law, a work
largely performed for the United States by Judge Moore. That celebrated
pioneer has also made known and is now further exploring the adjudications
of international tribunals. The present digests indicate how much is still to
be done in uncovering source materials. In the meantime, these volumes stand
as a monument to the imagination, resourcefulness, and industry of one of the
keenest and most eminent of European scholars, Professor Viktor Bruns, founder
of the distinguished Institut over which he presides, and leader of an able group
of collaborators from whom international law has already received much.
Yale School of Law. EDWIN M. BORCHAIM.
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS. Introductory Sirvey and Marriage. By Chester
G. Vernier, assisted by Fred A. Weller. Volume I. Stanford University:
Stanford University Press. 1931. pp. xxii, 311. $5.
THis volume, the first of a proposed series which is to cover the whole field
of domestic relations, deals only with the law of marriage, including the con-
tract to marry. The editor gives iri each section: (1) a brief summary of
the common law; (2) the statutory law; (3) comment and criticism; (4) a
selected list of references, including texts, case books, annotations, reports,
articles, and case notes from law magazines.
This is a solid piece of work, well done. It will be of great value to any
student of the subject. One should, however, be cautious in using a book of
this kind. The emphasis is on legislation. Perhaps no branch of the law
is at one and the same time so completely and sa incompletely statutory. In
every state the whole topical range of marriage and divorce has been covered
by statute, and yet, as Bishop pointed out many years ago, most of the statutory
provisions are declaratory and jurisdictional or else formal. That is to say,
statutes have generally conferred jurisdiction upon courts, usually, at the
outset, courts of equity, to grant relief which they did not have inherently, or
confirmed a jurisdiction which they had assumed, taking for granted a sub-
stantive law which rests upon the English common law, in this subject largely
ecclesiastical.
There has been no complete or even very extensive statutory overhauling of
the substantive law anywhere. When a statute has enacted new law it has
had reference chiefly to formal matters of license, ceremony and the like. The
result is that the substantive law is in its technique and in its essential nature
common law, but a common law of the statutes, a strange mixture of statutory
jurisdiction, ecclesiastical origins, and equity practice.
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